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KEVLES
advancement of the overarching structure of elementary-particle theory that they call the Standard Model. The Standard Model holds that all matter is formed of particles called quarks and leptons, that the existence and behavior of these particles are governed by different types of force fields, and that the interactions of these fields are mediated by the exchange of ele mentary particles. The Standard Model theoretically unifies three of the fundamental natural forces?the electromagnetic, the weak, and the strong.
The fourth, gravity, has remained beyond its reach. By the 1970s, indirect experimental evidence had accumulated in support of one of the Model's major triumphs?the theoretical prediction that at sufficiently high energies a deep symmetry characterizes both the electromagnetic and the weak forces so that they operate as a single "electroweak"
force. By then, too, the Standard Model had been exploited to understand the behavior of the universe close to the time of its origin in a Big Bang, when enormous ener gies were concentrated in a very small volume. As the universe cooled, the deep symmetry of the electroweak force was broken in a way that generated the electromagnetic and weak forces.
Nevertheless, the Standard Model posed a number of unanswered ques tions. High-energy physicists were particularly interested in probing for evi dence of what they call the Higgs force field?named after Peter Higgs, of Edinburgh University, who had most clearly postulated it in 1964?which was believed to play a role in the shattering of electroweak unification and to be necessary to explain why the particles in electromagnetic and weak interactions possess the masses they do; indeed, why they have any mass at all. On theoretical grounds, it was expected that the Higgs field would reveal itself through the presence of an exchange particle called the Higgs boson?which was predicted to have a mass so large that only a machine operating at the SSC's energy could produce it.1 High-energy enthusiasts also wanted the SSC because they worried that the United States was losing its leadership in elementary particle physics.
Europe, which supported the grand multinational accelerator installation acronymically named CERN (for Conseil Europeen de la Recherche Nucleaire), on the French-Swiss border, was spending twice as much on high-energy research relative to GNP as was the United States. The apprehension was ratified when, in the first half of 1983, CERN announced that it had directly observed three massive particles from a class called bosons? the Z-zero, the W-plus, and the W-minus?that in electroweak theory were predicted to mediate the electromagnetic and weak forces. The SSC's acceleration energy would be sixty times greater than the CERN collider's. It would be by far the most powerful proton accelerator in the world, could be ready by the 1990s, and would restore the United States'
pre-eminence in high-energy physics. In 1985, in an article on the SSC, Leon Lederman, the director of Fermilab, and Sheldon Glashow, a co winner of the Nobel prize with Weinberg for his role in the development of electroweak theory, averred that, "if we forgo the opportunity that the SSC offers for the 1990s, the loss will not only be to our science but also to the broader issue of national pride and technological self-confidence. When we were children, America did most things best. So it should again."2 Lederman, one of the principal spokesmen for the SSC, was an accom plished high-energy experimentalist who had made Nobel-prize-winning contributions to the development of the Standard Model during the 1960s, although the prize itself did not come until 1988. He was a fixture at
Congressional hearings on the collider, an unbridled, streetwise, and collo quial advocate of its merits who frankly avowed that the primary justification for the collider was intellectual curiosity. Yet neither Lederman nor his fellow enthusiasts refrained from claiming that the SSC would pay considerable practical dividends to the American political economy. The outcomes of cutting-edge scientific endeavors being largely unpredictable, Lederman and his allies could not be very specific about the future; they thus enlisted the historical record of particle physics, pointing to its past spinoffs and extrapolating from them to sketch the SSC's practical prom ises. The knowledge of nature that high-energy accelerators revealed was, in and of itself, not practically relevant, but the machines had spun off use ful dividends: radiations used in the processing of foods and materials and in the treatment of cancer; powerful light beams that can etch integrated circuits onto semiconductor chips at much greater densities than could oth erwise be achieved; and computerized methods and sophisticated technolo gies to screen and analyze superabundant data.
Advocates of the SSC suggested that protons from one of its low-energy KEVLES "Some 25 companies are making these things in a new industry that is approaching $1 billion dollars a year."3 Deputy Secretary of Energy W. Henson Moore, III, a lawyer and former Congressman from Louisana, per mitted enthusiasm to take him much further than Lederman by indicating to a Congressional committee that magnetic resonance imaging had been made possible by the work on superconducting magnets for the SSC.4 The step beyond medicine would produce important improvements and price reduc tions in the niobium-titanium wires needed to carry the enormous supercon ducting currents needed for innovations in power generation and transporta tion in the form of magnetically levitated trains.
Although federal funding for all of physics had declined through the 1970s following the Vietnam War, it had been rising dramatically with the Reagan administration's defense buildup, particularly its embrace of the
Strategic Defense
Initiative, and with the spreading absorption with economic competitiveness. In that high-technology climate, the SSC was endorsed by the Department of Energy, the agency that funds almost all high-energy physics in the United States, and, in January 1987, by President Ronald Reagan. It did not take a physicist to recognize that the SSC's $6 billion price tag would create direct and proximate dividends. The collider would create an abundance of industrial contracts and, as a Congressman put it, "an awful lot of jobs"?some five to eight thousand of them just where the SSC would be built. More than half the states in the union took steps to enter the site selection competition, which began on April 1, 1987. The New republic called it an invitation to "quark barrel politics. In 1989, Congress voted decisively to fund the construction of the SSC, agreeing on a total appropriation to the project of $225 million for 1990 and accepting a total cost for its construction of $5.9 billion. Two years later, in the summer of 1991, Congress appropriated more than twice as much for the collider and a move in the Senate to kill the project failed by a margin of almost two-to-one.
The SSC appropriations were to be an add-on to the existing high energy budget, which amounted annually to more than half a billion dollars and had remained roughly steady in constant dollars during the past four years. By 1991, the add-on had resulted in the award of more than $100 million in grants and contracts for SSC research to scientists and engineers at 90 universities and institutes in roughly 30 states. By 1990, some 150 physicists were hard at work in Waxahachie, part of an overall SSC work force that was moving past a thousand people under the direction of Roy Schwitters, appointed head of the SSC in January 1989. In his mid-forties, Schwitters was a distinguished high-energy experimentalist, a former member of the Harvard faculty, and a project leader at Fermilab?a seem ingly good bet to turn the gargantuan project into the reality of an operating accelerator.
The genome
By the mid-1980s, the American community was alive with talk about a human genome project. A variety of techniques and technologies had been developed that made it possible to isolate genes, locate them on chromo somes, and obtain the sequence of DNA base pairs that coded their genetic information. Discoveries about the role of genes in disease were coming along at a rapid pace. Potential killers such as familial hyper cholesterolemia, a cause of heart disease, had been traced to a recessive gene, and cancer had been identified as arising in part from the play of what were called oncogenes. Oncogenes had been identified as normal cel lular genes that went haywire as a result of deregulation or mutation.
Walter Gilbert, an avowed enthusiast of a genome project, persuaded several key scientists of its merits, including James D. Watson, the co discoverer of the structure of DNA and highly influential as the head of the As with the SSC, U.S. competitiveness in high technology was a salient selling point for the genome project. To be sure, by several measures, the United States led Europe and was far ahead of Japan in molecular biology and biotechnology in general and human genome research in particular, but the Japanese appeared to be mobilizing for a major push into molecular biology; they were also moving toward a major genome project of their own and, since the early 1980s, had been pressing the development of However, the increasing NIH commitment to the genome project by no means killed off the opposition to it; indeed, if anything, it intensified the dissent, which in 1987 spread more widely in the biomedical scientific com munity and grew increasingly heated. The project might now be largely in the friendly hands of NIH, but it suffered from the image that Walter Gil bert had given it?a three-billion-dollar Big Science crash program, built around a few large bureaucratized centers that would be given over to DNA sequencing and accomplish their task within several years. The work would be tedious, routinized, and intellectually unrewarding, the critics contended; in their view, sequencing the entire human genome would amount to bad and wasteful science. Only five percent of the base pairs in human DNA are estimated to code for genes. These coding regions, called "exons," are interspersed among extensive non-coding regions, long stretches of DNA formally termed "introns" and, informally, "junk DNA." From the per spective of the MIT biologist Robert Weinberg, an authority in oncogenet ics, "a gene appears as a small archipelago of information islands scattered amid a vast sea of drivel." It made no sense to Weinberg to spend time and resources to obtain data that would, for the most part, reveal little or noth is, money not to be taken from existing biomedical research. The money would at first be devoted primarily to phy sical and genetic mapping of human and other organisms, which would speed the search for genes related to disease (and was a type of research that many biologists wanted to pursue anyway). Part of the money would also be invested in the development of technologies that would make sequencing rapid and cheap enough to be accomplished in many ordinary sized laboratories rather than in just a few large facilities. In the view of the committee, the technological development could be done at up to ten large, multidisciplinary centers around the country. The biological research could be pursued in the usual way, with money granted on a competitive, peer-review basis to able investigators wherever they might be.20
Wyngaarden's thinking matched that in the report. Early in 1988 he had explained his preferences to David Baltimore, who agreed to chair a high-level scientific advisory meeting on the genome project that Wyngaar den arranged to convene at the beginning of March in Reston, Virginia. In the House now, as in 1992, the SSC faced unremitting opposition from its chief critic, Sherwood Boehlert, from the Oneida district in upstate New York, a moderate Republican of independent mind and sharp tongue.
The year before, he had derided the SSC as a medley of endlessly increas ing costs, threats to other sciences, and unwarranted predictions of spinoffs for competitiveness, declaring, "Contrary to all the hype, the SSC will not cure cancer, will not provide a solution to the problem of male-pattern bald ness, and will not guarantee a World Series victory for the Chicago Cubs."36 In a House hearing that spring, Boehlert had remonstrated that the session deserved the title, "The night of the living dead," explaining that even though the House had killed the SSC, "it keeps rising from the dead to suck out our budget dollars. The House nevertheless voted on June 24 once again to end the SSC, by a strongly bipartisan vote of 280 to 150, which was so lopsided as to make the project's friends wonder whether this time it could prevail in the Senate.
In Senate hearings in August, Steven Weinberg questioned the close over sight of the project?eight audits had been underway in the spring. "It seems that there is an effort being made to replace the system that gave us Fermi Lab with the system that gave us the B-l Bomber."
In a House hear ing in May, Weinberg had testified that if the SSC was killed, "you may as well say good-bye to any responsible program of high-energy physics, and with it.. .any hope in this country in our time of discovering a final theory of nature." Now he warned that killing the SSC could also begin "the kil ling of support for basic science in this country."40 The SSC's most important friend in the upper chamber was J. Bennett Johnston, a senator from Louisiana, who chaired the Energy and Natural 1993, that as he understood it, the questions that the SSC would address "lie astride the common boundary between theology and science." Suffice it to say, Johnston reported, "that many scientists see in the patterns, the complexities, the symmetries, and yet the simplicity of matter and quarks and leptons and the way they are put together, the hand of God. And to the extent that I am given a peek at what they have to say, I agree with that."41
Johnston worked his magic again, guiding the Senate on the morning of September 30 to reject an attempt to kill the SSC by a bipartisan majority of 57 to 42. The SSC cleared a House-Senate conference with its full appropriation, imbedded in a multi-billion dollar energy and water appropri ations bill, but it was decisively and irrevocably turned back in the House, on October 19, by the overwhelming vote of 282 to 143. "The SSC has been lynched, and we have to bury the body," Johnston snapped.42
THE SURVIVAL OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT Indicted as Big Science
During the early 1990s, the Human Genome Project, like the SSC, con tinued to win enemies within the scientific community. In February 1990, Martin Rechsteiner, a professor in the biochemistry department at the University of Utah, sent a letter to colleagues around the United States con tending that the human genome project is "a waste of national resources" and urging like-minded scientists to raise a protest against the project to 41. CR, 103rd, Senate (29 Sep 1993), S12705.
42.
Ibid., H8101, H8109, H81117; "Congress pulls the plug on the Super Collider," Los Angeles The new round of dissidents were troubled, even angered, by the fact that, while the genome project had been prospering, general basic research in the biological sciences had been financially squeezed. In a letter to Sci ence magazine, John C. Lucchesi, chairman of the Genetics Study Section in the Division of Research Grants at NIH, predicted that "a few rounds of funding at the present award rates will very quickly result in a reduction in the number of active laboratories to less than half their current number_Arguments are made that the human genome project will give birth to a new generation of technologies. What good will that do in the absence of individuals trained and capable of applying these technologies?"
Rechsteiner's resentment of the trend was typical: "During these hard times we saw the disbursal of previously unheard of amounts of money to a hand ful of genomists."46 In the view of the dissidents, the $200 million a year that the project was eventually slated to get would be much better spent easing the strained circumstances of basic biomedical research. Rechsteiner noted that while such sums might not be large by defense department standards, they might appear to be "all the money in the world" to a "struggling young assistant
professor." The critics commonly pointed out how many basic biomedical research grants?of the current average size of $212,000?might be carved from the genome project budget. 
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In its deliberate emphasis on technological and methodological innova tion, the genome project flew in the face of tradition and preference in the biomedical research community. Some of the rhetoric raised against the project seemed to suggest that technology is no more than an auxiliary to genuine biological research, that it was even somehow alien to the enter prise, and that progress in the biomedical sciences is best achieved by lone investigators using simple methods and simple tools. The rhetoric had fre quently surfaced before in the annals of 20th-century experimental biology, as though experimental biologists had not gotten over the turn-of-the century charges by natural historians that the study of life could not be con ducted in the non-natural environment of Petri dishes. It became sufficiently commonplace to make its way into the 1954 Nobel prize ceremonies, when a member of the Royal Caroline Institute remarked, "The electronics, radioactive isotopes, and complicated biochemistry of our age has threatened to turn medical science into something dangerously resembling technology. Now and again we need to be reminded of its fundamental bio logical elements."48
The fact of the matter, however, was that progress in the biomedical sci ences had been empowered and accelerated to a considerable extent by sophisticated tools and technologies?notably the ultracentrifuge, radioactive isotopes, x-ray diffraction, chromatography, electrophoresis, and electron microscopy. None of these technologies was indigenous to biology. All were originally the products of the physical sciences or physical scientists at the fringes of biology, and many were developed partly with philanthro pic or commercial support for use in biological research. For example, the builders of cyclotrons, the first abundant source of radioactive isotopes, found much of their initial financial patronage in medically oriented phi lanthropies eager to foster the construction of machines that would supply the isotopes cheaply and in profusion. Since World War II, the principal source has been the atomic piles of the Atomic Energy Commission and its The genome project's technological emphasis has undoubtedly contri buted to its Big-Science image?and helped fuel the celebration of conven tional small-scale research in the biomedical sciences as a preferable alter native. The celebratory defense of the individual investigatory enterprise as small science seems to lack informed perspective: The capital and operat ing costs, number of graduate students, postdoctoral fellows, and techni cians, laboratory space and equipment surely combined to make the .enter prise large-scale, if not altogether big, science compared with, say, Thomas Hunt Morgan's microscopes, jars of fruit flies, rotting-banana food stocks, and handful of graduate students, or Watson and Crick's tinker-toy and paper-cutout modeling of hypotheses for the structure of DNA.
The way that the project was identified with Big Science in scientific journals and the press tended to cloud matters. The discussion was selective?the genome project was Big Science but the AIDS program, which spends far more annually, is somehow not?and undiscriminating.
The project was lumped together with the Superconducting Supercollider and the space station?efforts that involve not only big money but big machines and big organizations.50 The fact is that, although the genome The mixed form has been a standard feature of big-facility science research programs that depend on major technological instruments such as high-energy particle accelerators, planetary probes, or arrays of radio tele scopes. The creation, maintenance, and operation of the facility fall under the centralized control and direction of a large cadre of scientists and engineers (in the case of the Superconducting Supercollider, of an army of them, organized to design and develop the accelerator as well as its detector technologies). However, the uses of the facility for research are federally determined, the product of pluralist initiatives by research groups distri buted in a variety of institutions. training students who populated university, industrial, and federal labora tories, including weapons establishments, and contributing to the high technology postwar economy?both iigiirectly, through military spinoffs, and directly, through research in myriad fields such as transistors, computers, lasers, and fiber optics.
The most prominent and influential physicists were elementary-particle physicists. Comprising about ten percent of the American physics com munity in the 1980s, their leaders had won many of the Nobel prizes awarded to Americans and had been key figures in the nation's strategic defense and science policymaking councils. During the postwar decades, elementary-particle physics prospered handsomely. One of the leading rationales for the policy that gave abundant funds to particle physics was a reading of history. Seemingly impractical research in nuclear physics had led to the decidedly tangible result of the atomic bomb; research in particle physics had to be pursued because it might produce a similarly practical surprise. In the context of the Cold War, particle physics provided an insurance policy that if something important to national security emerged Enthusiasts of the genome project have not been blind to the magnitude of its technical challenges. They have recognized the difficulties and uncer tainties in producing the necessary genetic maps and sequencing technolo gies. They have been well aware that straightforward sequencing of the entire human genome cannot, as a matter of financial practicality, be accomplished unless and until the cost of sequencing a base pair is drasti cally reduced. Still, as uncertain outcomes in science and technology go, the genome project has been a decidedly good bet?a better one, it might be argued, than many other technologically dependent enterprises. A giant accelerator that fails to work or is abandoned before completion will likely produce little if anything of scientific value. In contrast, obtaining just a fraction of the human genome sequence, particularly the fraction containing the genes for disease, will pay high scientific and medical dividends.60
Completely or partially successful, the genome project will yield what one observer has termed "an orgy of information," a harvest that, in the judgment of Francis S. Collins, one of the co-discoverers of the gene for cystic fibrosis will "drive the research enterprise for at least the next 100 In contrast to the assault against the SSC, the attacks against the Human Genome Project were largely ineffective, failing to bring it to a halt for several reasons. In 1991, NIH expenditures on the project accounted for only one percent of the agency's total budget of $8 billion. If the project came to be funded at the $200 million a year recommended by the National Academy of Sciences, the NIH share would have amounted to just 1.5 per cent of the agency's total 1991 budget or roughly 3 percent of its resources 64. Eric Lander, "The Human Genome Project," talk at "Scientist-to-scientist colloqui um," Keystone, Colorado (Aug 1991).
